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POPULAR PREJUDICE

CONCERNING

Partiality to the Interests of Hanover.



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TOTHE

Subjects of that Electorate, and particularly to the *Hanoverian* Troops in *British* Pay, freely Examined and Discussed;

INWHICH

The Conduct of that Corps, at Dettingen particularly, and during the whole late Campaign, is truly Stated and Vindicated.

I N

A Letter from an Officer at Hanover to a Hanoverian Nobleman at the Hague.

Translated from the Original.



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Popular Prejudice, &c.

SIR

HOUGH I can perceive, as you do, that the base Reflections pointed directly at myself in particular, and our Countrymen in general, throughout all those various printed English Papers and Prints you fent me, are no less, tho' obliquely, levelled at the Person of our Gracious and August M-r, yet cannot I think it eligible at this Juncture, as you feem inclined I should, to complain to him of the particular injurious Affronts offered to us of the Military Part of his Subjects here, or represent to him with what Injustice and Acrimony all his G—n Subjects are treated by a Nation, whom, tho' we esteem and honour, we are under no manner of Tie or Obligation of bowing to and adoring.

If he was less hurried than he necessarily must be at the Eve of his Departure; or had he more Leisure to indulge one whom he is pleased to Honour with his Confidence, as he does me, I should not, however, think it

B proper

proper to make a Complaint which would create an Uneafiness in his Royal Breast, without any Hopes of his being able to procure us adequate, or, indeed, any Satisfaction at all for the infulting Indignities offered us for many Years past, but particularly of late. Was his Power less circumscribed than it is among that haughty People, how would it be possible for him to redress his injured faithful Subjects of the E-e, in the Instance under our present Consideration? He might, indeed, order the faife, scandalous Libels published against them, to be publickly burnt, and the Printers and Publishers to be feverely punished; but as the Laws itand there at present, even this jejune Reparation he is not able to procure for us, without the Concurrence of those, who, perhaps, are no less envious and jealous of us, than they who thus publickly calumniate us.

It is our Happiness, and our Comfort, that all the Nations of Europe are not more sensible of the Injustice of the Charge brought against us, by our Regal Fellow-Subjects, for the Conduct of our Troops in the Field the last Campaign, than they are, that the Troops of that Nation, who inveigh most against us, have not behaved at Dettingen so as might be expected from a People that arrogate all Military Vtues to the mselves, without admitting others to an Equality. I am far from intending or being willing to uncover the Sores of a Nation so esteemed by

our Gracious S—n; but Self Defence renders it absolutely necessary to set the Transactions of that important Day in their just and proper Lights. Shall we be arraign'd of Pusillanimity, or worse, of rank Cowardice, in an Occasion of Honour, and not retort the injurious Attempt of rendering us contemptible in the Eyes of Europe? Should the highest national Obligations induce an accused, injured People to be silent under the highest Provocations? But when there are no Obligations that bind, shall not we tell our unfaithful Accusers, why do you bear fulse Witness a-

gainst us?

Was the Calumny confined; were we traduced but by a few; did only the Disaffected and Impotent traduce us in Whispers, as in the Beginning of the late Reign, it might be prudent to overlook the Infult, and despise the Infulters: But, my worthy Friend, the calumnious Insult is grown too big and too public to be overlooked: The whole People, at least most of them, feem to abet those ungenerous Pens that thus asperse and vilify the foreign Subjects of their Prince. All our Advices agree, that their Jealouly of Foreigners, to natural to that felfish Nation, is of late confined to us H-ns: Their Rancour to the Fiench, holds, at present, but the second Place. Malice and Envy seem to ingross those once generous Hearts, who glowed, not long fince, with the warmest Affection and sincerest Friendship. How were we careffed in the Begining B 2 of of the late Reign? How was our Sovereign beloved and adored? But how fatally is the happy Scene chang'd! I won't suppose the Affection of that People cool'd in regard to the Prince, because my Zeal won't permit me to make any Supposition disadvantageous to his Interest; but with regard to us, his foreign Subjects, it is too obvious, that they are not only cool'd in Affection towards us, but become unnaturally and ungenerously

envious and jealous of us.

This growing ungenerous national Prejudice, was it a Secret, was it not already known to all the Nations of Europe, I should be the last that would divulge or refent it: But, alas! 'tis but too evident and notorious; that jaundiced People have published their partial Prejudice every where: They propagate the invidious Distinctions of H-ns and E—n, at Home and Abroad; and even all last Summer in the Camp, they were no less industrious to sow the Distinction, than they are now to brand us with Cowardice. There was no Union or Harmony between them and us in the Camp. They made it impossible there should be any, tho' all that was possible was done on our Side to cement a good Understanding. All our Officers, and even the common Men, had Orders to behave with Caution towards their Infular Fellow-Subjects. They did fo; but what was the Effects of Good-Nature and Discipline on our our Side, was construed Pusillanimity and

Slavishness by that haughty People.

Let our Behaviour be never so obliging, it was construed to our Disadvantage: How then should we behave towards a People that were determined not to be pleafed with any Thing we could do? The poor low Prejudice was not confined to the common Men, it was fpread to those of Rank and Distinction; it was as visible in Councils of W-r, as at common Ordinaries and Taverns. The G—ls feem'd as much infected as the Subalterns: And the Origine of that Misunderstanding, which induced a great Man to defire Leave to retire, probably was no other than that ill-grounded Prejudice which all his Countrymen feem to have contracted of late. You may judge how deeprooted that unwarrantable Prejudice was in his Heart, when he could be influenced by it to f-e his H-r to his R-t in the midst of a Campaign; but of this more when I come to confider the Action at Dettingen, and the Conduct of the different Corps during the whole Campaign: In the mean while, let me examine Matters a priori, to fee if, in the Discussion, we can find Cause for affigning even a colourable Pretext for that ungenerous Prejudice which is fo visible throughout that whole People, and fo injurious to us.

Their Choice of our August Family was spontaneous, or at least seems to have been so; there was no Corruption on our Side; and if

there was any Art or Compulsion made use of by the Prince then on the Throne, or his Creatures, they alone are answerable; we are chargeable with neither, nor with Collusion of any kind: Therefore then are they unwarranted in their Prejudice from any Cause

arising from the Act of Succession.

From the passing that Law in Favour of our Princes, who were the next Protestant Heirs, to the Demise of Queen Ann, our Behaviour was fuch as could not possibly give Offence to the English Nation. Our Court went into all their Views against France during that War; and if, upon the Change of that Princels's Ministry, our August Elector feem'd to adhere to the Party opposing the Court, it was by Advice of his Friends, and not to create or foment Distinctions, to encourage Party Animolities, or to injure the Nation in any Shape. To that Time then are our Enemies unable to shew that we have given room for the Spleen and Ill-Nature that have appear'd fince.

But during this Interval, how circumspect and guarded soever our Conduct was towards the English Nation, there are those who attack us as unjustly on Account of the Behaviour of our Troops in the Field at that Time, as for that of our Forces at Dettingen. Both Charges are equally unjust and ill sounded; the latter I shall prove to be so when I come to discuss the Operations of the last Cam-

paign;

paign; the first is founded on the following Circumstance.

The present King of Sweden, when Prince of Hesse, they say, would have rais'd the Siege, and probably have faved Landau in 1703, if the Corps of *Hanoverians* in his Army had not refused to join in the Undertaking. This Refusal is magnified and improved into Cowardice by our malicious Enemies; whereas, if it were true that our Troops did refuse to join in raising that Siege, it would be rather a Proof of their adhering to the Treaty with Queen Ann, than of want of Courage, of which they gave many fignal Proofs during that long and fanguine War: But where is the Proof that our Troops had refused? Is Hear-say a sufficient Warrant for aspersing a whole People? But Hear-say, and the slightest Rumour are Proofs to a Nation prejudiced and imbittered.

For my own Part, tho' I was in that Army under the Prince of Hesse, I never heard of any such Resusal as is now invidiously imputed to us; there were many other cogent Reasons why he ought not, why he could not undertake raising that Siege: But supposing our Commander in Chief had resused to march to the Upper Rhine, was he not warranted by the Treaty of Convention in 1702 between Queen Ann and our August House? By the 5th Article of that Treaty, which has been lately so often mentioned and improved to our Disadvantage, our Troops were not to be

be commanded to any great Distance from the Lower Rhine.

ART. 5. 'Their Electoral and most Serene Highnesses reserve to themselves the Liberty of recalling those Troops, either the Whole or Part, in case that they are 'attacked, or in evident Danger of being attacked in the Dominions which they pof-'fels; and her Majesty consents to this Reser-'vation. And in order to facilitate their Return in fuch Cases, they shall not be re-' moved to any great Distance from the Lower · Rhine?

'Tis true, that, by the first separate Article of the faid Treaty, there was an Alteration made in this Article; but still the Varia-

tion gave no Title to the Prince of Helle to march our Troops to the Upper Rhine, as may be seen by the Article at large. I. Separate Article. 'The very important · Reasons which have moved their Electoral and most Serene Highnesses of Brunswick ' and Lunenburg, to defire that, for the Security of their Dominions, their Troops, which are employed for the common Cause, may onot be removed to a greater Distance from them than for the Operations on the Lower Rhine, having obliged them to make that Refervation in the 5th Article of the Convention, with Regard to those they have fent to her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain; and having confidered afterwards, that the common Cause might render them ' necessary Inecessary, even on the other Side of the Maese, it is agreed on both Sides, that when the State of the War shall demand an Operation on the other Side of that River, in which the whole Army shall be employed, the said Troops shall pass that River, and act with the said Army; but if a Body of Troops be left on this Side, considerable enough to put all the Troops of their Electoral and most Serene Highnesses upon Action, they shall be employed preserably to the other Troops of this Army. As for the rest, the said 5th Article of the Convention remains intire as it stands, in case they are wanted at home.

This Convention with Great Britain, and one with Holland about the same time, were of the same Tenor, as to this Particular of not removing our Troops from the Lower Rhine; or, if they should be removed, that it should not be higher up that River. Without Doubt the Princes of our August House had their Reasons for this Stipulation; nor is it less probable, that their Commanders in the Field had possitive Orders to observe it literally and punctually. Upon this natural and probable Presumption than, how can the Resusal of our Troops, supposing it actual, to join in the Siege of Landau, a Fortress far on the Upper Rhine in Alface, be construed to the Disadvantage of our Country, or improved into Cowardice? Does it not argue an unprecedented Inveteracy? Do they not betray

Wonder not, my noble Friend, that I take some Pains to invalidate what has been industriously spread abroad to our Disadvantage on this Head. Our Enemies feem to fix upon it as an indelible Mark of our patrial Cowardice; they proclaim and improve it purpofely to load us with Scorn and Infamy. This appears but too evidently from their artful Turns and false Suggestions in Regard to this particular Transaction; which, it it was as they themselves state the Fact, would be a Proof of our Duty and Obedience to our Sovereign, but none of Want of Bravery or Cowardice. The Hanoverian Gallantry in the Field is too well known in Germany to require a Justification; but it seems to be quite misunderstood, or grossv misrepresented in Enghand, where we might expect to meet not only

only with Candour and Impartiality, but with

Friendship and Respect.

For this Reason, then, you won't wonder atmy Pains to state the Transaction at length; nor, if you confider how fenfibly I am affected and provoked, even in my own Person, will you wonder at the Warmth of my Refentment; but, could I pocket all personal Indignities, could I be entirely passive as to what affects myself particularly, I cannot so readily observe Silence, when the Virtue of my Country is arraigned; and even could I do this, I must be tamer than my Countrymen are painted by the E— \hbar , to shut my Lips, when I hear the Virtue and Magnanimity of my August M-r doubted, or, rather, flatly and roundly denied. -- Read all the late printed defamatory Libels come to us from the other Side of the Water, and say if the personal Reflection and Conduct of a Great and Gracious Prince, and a Confummate Warrior, was ever fo ridiculed and vilified? Say then, if one who would gladly lay down his Life to serve his Sovereign, would not be to blame if he did not endeavour to rescue so great a Name from the Attempts of his Enemies and ours? For fuch those Libellers must be.

This is incumbent upon me; 'tis incumbent upon our whole People on a double Score; as he is our Sovereign, and a tender Parent; and as all the poisoned Shafts pointed at his Honour and Character are owing to his Affection to this his native Country, and his paternal

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Tenderness for us, his old, faithful and affectionate Subjects. Did he hate his Mother Country, did he oppress the most zealous begets in the World, he would have escaped the Rancour lately vented against him. Was he macural and a Tyrant on this Side the Water, 'tis probable he would be revered and adored on that. Such is the contradictory Nature of that ungenerous Nation, that they condemn their Prince, for what he deserves the highest Praise and Encomium.

But there is no altering Nature; or, if there were, I am fure it could not be by a People that think it beneath them, even to correct her. Self-opinion and Self-Interest have too much the Ascendant to suffer the E—sh to stoop to the Drudgery of correcting Nature: Self-Interest raises their Jealousy of all the Nations of the World, but particularly of us; and Self-opinion induces them to look down with Contempt upon all Foreigners, but on

us above all others.

But why this general Contempt of Foreigners, by a People that have the Blood, and perhaps not the best neither, of all the Nations in Europe running in their Veins? And why this Contempt particularly of us, from whom their Saxon Ancestors were originally sprung? The E—sh are but too justly stigmatized for a haughty Contempt of Foreigners, and yet no Nation in the World are more indebted to Foreigners than they. They owe the best of their Customs and Laws, and their very

very Constitution, to their Saxon Ancestors; that is, to us, who are the same People with the Saxons. Their Commerce they owe to the Flemings, and their Arts and Sciences to the French and Italians: They are indebted to the French particularly for the Art of War, and for that little Share of Politeness they possess: In short, there is no one Good they are in Possession of, nor no one good Quality they have, but they owe to some foreign Nation or other, whom, however, they can't treat with either Civility or Humanity; their bad Qualities indeed seem intirely to be of native Growth. Contradiction is fo grafted in their Nature, that they treat even their own Fellow-subjects of Ireland and Scotland with as great Inhumanity and Imperiousness as they do Foreigners: They plume themselves not only upon their being free themselves, but being the Assertors and Bulwarks of Liberty all over Europe; and they vilify most of the Nations on the Continent, but particularly ours, for being Slaves, as they call us: But yet I defy them to point out any Nation in Europe kept in more abject Slavery and Dependance than the Irish are by themselves.

That Nation, for any thing I could ever fee or hear, are as brave and faithful as their Neighbours; they have the fame Laws and Customs, speak the same Language, have the same Religion, and are not less loyal to their Prince; yet, for all this, and that in

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Reality they and the English are but the same People divided into two different Islands, they seem, in most Respects, but as Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water to these boasting Bulwarks of the Liberties of Europe.

I am warranted to speak thus of English T—y and Irish Slavery, from the Authority of some of the Natives, Men of the strictest Probity and Honour, whom I had the good Fortune to contract an Intimacy with the last Campaign: And upon this Head, I can't but repeat what I had often heard our Countryman, the late Count Bothmar, say of the Policy of England with Regard to Ireland, viz. That it would seem the English designed to force the Irish to be refractory Subjects.—

But after all, where can be the Policy of England to deprive Ircland of all the Means of becoming oppulent and flourishing? Surely Wealth in Ireland may be deemed an Accession to the Wealth of England: for, in Countries under the same Prince, no matter where, or in which of them there are most Riches, it being certain that they will equally contribute to the Power of the Government, whether immediately in that Country where the Seat of Empire is, or in one more distant.

If this Observation holds true in general, as I am sure it will, the Conduct of England towards Ireland is no less a Solecism in Politics, than the Prejudice of the E——h Nation to

us, who are Subjects to the same Prince, of the same Religion, and in the same Interest. Are the Irish rich and powerful, their Wealth and Power must necessarily add to the Power of England. In like Manner must all Additions to the Wealth and Power of this Electorate be an Increase of the Power of that Nation that envy us our *Poverty*.—What elfe can they envy us for? We have no Trade, no Manufactures, no Sort of Commerce that interferes with theirs; we rival them in nothing; we attempt no Rivalship; we pretend to none, but in the Glory of Arms, and in Steadiness of Loyalty and Affection to our Sovereign: In these, and in all Acts of Virtue, we confess ourselves their Rivals; and in these we will yield neither to them nor any other Nation in the World.

We deny not Resolution and Bravery to the English; we refuse no disciplined Nation these military Virtues, because we see that all Nations that have equal Experience, behave equally brave; but our infular Fellow-Subjects refuse us particularly, all military Virtues; witness all those defamatory printed Papers you fent me; witness the public Defamation all last Summer in the Camp, by most of their O-rs, and all their common S—rs: But I defer too long the Justification of our Conduct at Dettingen, and throughout the whole Campaign. My Impatience, my Honour won't permit me any longer to stifle Truth, or delay setting Men Men and Facts in their native and proper Lights.—When I have done my Duty; when I have given Vent to the big Anxiety which swells my Heart, for being upbraided with Cowardice in common with the rest of my Countrymen, not excepting a Name that ought to be facred: When I have gone thro' this necessary Part of my Subject, I will refume the other.

I might here enter into a minute Discussion and Justification of the Conduct and Wisdom of our Prince in all his Steps for saving the House of Austria, and preserving a Balance of Power; and, in particular, I might enlarge on his prudential Condescention in leaving his German Dominions exposed, to reinforce the E——sh Army designed to act in the Common Cause: But I chuse to wave this Discussion, in this Place, to come more immediately to the Subject of the Campaign, as being immediately more interesting.

It may be said, that the Operations of the last Campaign begun by the March of the combined Army from the Netherlands to the Rhine; and herein, tho' the E—Jh had the Honour of the Lead, I could see no Traces of E—Jh Virtue of any Kind more than of Hanoverian. We marched in as good Order, observed as good Discipline, and, I answer for it, would give as good Account of an Enemy, was there one in the Way to disturb the March. I won't say that our Men or Horses were as high sed, and locked as sleek as those

of

of the E-fb Corps; but I will answer, that our Men and Horses were as well cloathed and accoutred, made as fair an Appearance, exercifed better, and look'd in all Refpects more warlike than those who seek to strip them of all Military Fame. If we were not as fat and foggy, we were not less active and nimble; and, if our Neighbours had greater Pay, and fed and drank more and higher, we were not less strong of Limbs, or less hearty and wholsom; and, if after we encamped together, our Troops fared better, it was not owing, as is maliciously suggested in those Libels you sent me, to a Partiality in affigning us better Quarters, but to the Industry of our Men, who took more Pains to provide, and to their Frugality, who make a Stiver go as far as their Fellow-Soldiers did two.

This appeared evidently at Aschaffenbourg, where there could be no Choice of Situation. The E——sh soon consumed their Provisions, and were soon in Want, whilst we, being better Husbands, did not want so much, nor so early. This Consideration leads me to repeat what most Nations have observed and said of the E——sh, viz. that, feed them high, and they will fight; but forced to short Allowance, they are lower in Spirits and Courage than gallant Men should be. I shall only observe on this Head, that those Nations who can bear Cold and Hunger best and longest, are the fittest for War; and that the

E—h are not of those Nations most famous for Fatigue and Abstinence. I could perceive that their very Cattle participate of the slimsy Texture of their Masters; for unless an E—h Horse be fed high and often, he is the veriest Jade in Europe, tho' as much, or more high mettled and spirited than that of any other Country, when his

Craving is regularly supplied.

Their own Countryman, the ingenious * Mr. Temple, seems to confirm what all Fo-tells us, the Opinion which Prince Maurice of Nassau had of them, when he said, that the E—fh were brave if put upon Action immediately after they came from their Beef and Pudding, but that he would not warrant for them after they should be forty Days from their own Country. This was an Observation founded, we are to suppose, on Experience, made by a Man of Sense and a gallant Officer; and more, by a Friend to the Nation. Let me take Notice however, that Foreigners don't observe in the same disadvantageous Manner of H-ns; we meet with no fuch harsh Sayings concerning the Inequality of their personal Resolution.

But had we lain under any fuch Imputation, should it be thrown in our Teeth by the only Nation in Europe who ought to be most cautious of giving Room for Altercation of

this

^{* &#}x27;Tis Supposed the Author means Sir William Temple.

this, or indeed of any other Kind? Ought not the E——/b, of all Nations, be tender of the Character of others, who are themfelves more liable to Censure than any other People in Europe? And would it not be always for the Interest of E——d, that a People so closely linked to her as we are, should be in Repute with the other Nations on the Continent? Yet, for all this substantial Reason, we find them loudest in our Dispraise, and their Dispraise founded on the falsest Accusation.

I wonder what do that arrogating People found their chimerical Title to universal Military Prowess upon? They have been conquered by all the impotent Nations that invaded them. The Saxons, the Danes, the Normans, all the Conquerors of E - d, except the Romans, were weak and impotent, compared with the Conquered. What Victories they obtain'd formerly in France, they paid dearly for, by subsequent Losses. They have not much Reason to boast of their Prowefs during King William's Reign; and furely they are not fo weak or vain to arrogate to themselves the Glory of the Prince of Savoy and the Duke of Marlborough's Successes against Lewis XIV? Those great Captains never attacked the French with lefs 100,000 Men, of which the E— β may have been about 10,000 at most; one half at least of the Corps, which went under the Denomination of E—f in that Army, was composed composed of Scotch and Irish; and two-thirds of their General-Officers were of these more hardy Nations: So that the most they can say, as to the Victories in Queen Ann's Reign, is, that they have an equal Title with other Nations, whose Troops composed the Consederate Army, to the Glory of having humbled France: And are not Hanoverians intitled likewise to a Proportion of that

Glory?——

'Tis probable our prejudiced Fellow-Subjects will be partial enough to refuse us our Share, not only of this, but all other Military Fame, when they can be so weak as to be led away by the most profligate Pens that ever aspersed a brave and injured People. Lamberty, the most partial and abandoned Writer that ever attempted to inform the Public, is an inspired, infallible Penman with that credulous Nation. Upon his bare Authority, contrary to the Knowledge of innumerable living Witnesses, they not only asperse us, in regard to not joining the Prince of Helli in 1703, as mentioned before, but in King William's Reign, with misbehaving at the Battle of Landen; and since, at that of Malplaguet.——

In nothing more than in this Instance does the partial Inveteracy the E—fb Libellers appear. They might have consulted many Writers of infinitely more Weight than Lamberty; they had Numbers of their own on whom they might rely, but that would not answer

answer their Purpose of ridiculing and vilifying their P——e in the Persons of his H——n

Subjects.

What Answer can it be expected I should make to Calumnies founded on the Report of a Writer, whom no other People in Europe but the unheeding E——fb would quote, much less believe in Opposition to the Testimony of living Witnesses. I appeal to their own Histories, their own Gazettes, the Letters of their own Generals relating to the Actions at Landen and Malplaguet. If our Misbehaviour had been as represented by our Enemies, or rather those of Truth, 'tis not to be supposed that their own Officers and Writers in those Days, would all of them have been filent in regard to our Conduct: But could we have expected more Candour from those that impute Cowardice to us at Dettingen, in the Face of a witnessing Sun, and in Contradiction to the Testimony of three-score thousand Men, including the French in the Field of Action?—But this Digression, which the cruel Prejudice of our false Accusers obliged me to, hurried me from my Subject.

The first Operation of any Consequence, after the Junction of the Army, was crossing the Mayne, to seek——I can't say the Enemy, for we knew there was none so near as was given out by those who seem'd very much inclined to make a Bustle and Noise, in order, I suppose, to be thought active and vigilant. In regard to this Motion, I freely

own, I could not see the Use or Design of it, tho' I did not protest against it; nor have I ever heard it justified to my Satisfaction: And I believe that a Personage infinitely greater than I, was as little satisfied with that hazardous Step as I was, when he came to know it. To fay no more of it, it was a precipitate Measure that had like to prove fatal; for had not the Error been repair'd as early as it was; had we waited eight Hours longer to repass the River, we should have had a superior French Army on our Backs; but let me observe, that in this salutary Retreat, our Troops had the Post of Honour, that is, of Hazard, assign'd them. This was the Rear, where there possibly could be any Danger. On this Occasion, let those stand forth that were present, who dare say, that H-ns, betray'd either Pufillanimity or want of Difcipline or Conduct.—If I were inclin'd to judge rigidly, I could object to the too great Precipitancy of a certain Corps in repassing the Magne in that Retreat; but I fcorn to stoop to that Meanness which some others do. I shall never attempt raising a Character by depreciating that of others: All I shall ever attempt, will be to rescue injured Characters from Scandal and Obloquy, and to do general Justice, by producing Truth without Disguise.

These Motions of passing and repassing the Mayne, were attended with so great Fatigue, that the Troops in general made heavy Com-

plaints;

plaints; but none were so vociforous as the E--fh, who, right or wrong, would fix the Odium on the H—n Officers, tho' it was well known to them, and notorious to the whole Army, that the Error should be placed to the Account of others.

But these Motions, how erroneous soever they were thought to be, may be reckon'd falutary, if compar'd to that which follow'd immediately. This was the March to Afchaffenbourg, which was not undoubtedly of my Projection.—Before the Arrival of our August Chief, I might reason, express my Dislike, and argue from Experience, but I was heard and that was all: But after our Chief had narrowly examined the State of Affairs, and found that I had no Share in Measures he could not approve of, the Scene was chang'd: And what wonder, that Prince should countenance those most, whose Counsels are most salutary, and can best bear the Test of Wisdom and Experience? Here it was that we were bleffed with the Royal Presence, which promised to diffipate all Feud and Animolity; but instead of any thing so desireable, it seem'd rather to increase the Jealousy of the E— β , whose Prejudice to us was very distinguishable ever fince the Army had been form'd.

From the Moment of the Junction, our Troops were viewed, not only with a jealous, but a disdainful Eye; but from the Arrival of the K—— at Aschaffenbourg, from jealous

jealous and disdainful Looks, the rooted Prejudice grew up into indecent, offensive Expresfions, and a haughty Infolence of Behaviour, which nothing but the great Warmth of our Zeal for our Sovereign's Interest, could have induced us to bear with that Temper we did. A gracious Word or Look from the Kto any of our Corps, was Treason in us, and probably thought a Crime in him. Had any of us the Honours of the Royal Table, it was thought capital in the hospitable Host as well as the Guest. If he seem'd to relish the Reasoning of any of us in Council, it bred fuch ill Blood, as produced an observable Sullenness, even in the aged and experienc'd: And if it happen'd that he condescended to confer with any of us in private, as it was often absolutely necessary he should, there were no Bounds to the Jealoufy nor unpolite, unbecoming Arrogance of some, whose Duty, one would think, should have inspired them to behave more fuitably to the M-r's Dignity and their own Rank and Character.

The Jealoufy was of us only, there was none of the Austrians. The K—might be as courteous as he pleased to them, no Notice was taken of it: But did he cast his Eye on that Part of the Camp where we were, it was criminal. I am not sure but his very Thoughts were interpreted to our Disadvantage, and probably to his also: For my Part, I could not help commisserating the Condition of our most Gracious S—n, who,

as he could not but observe the Prejudice of one Part of his People, and the Mortifications of the other, must necessarily seel an Uneafiness which no Dutiful or Loyal Subjects would willingly give him: But why should we expect a dutiful Deference for our P-e from a People famed, not only for disturbing the Quiet, and refisting their K-s, but for dethroning, and even cutting off their Sacred Heads: Witness their own Annals.-And in regard to their injurious Treatment of their S—ns, there is one Thing observable of them, which is not known of any other Nation on Earth; and that is, that they take Pride and Glory in the Perjury and eminent Wickedness of their Foresathers. I have now in my Hands many of their most celebrated Works, wherein the Murder of K — Charles I. is justified and applauded. won't affirm that this has been, or is the Sense of the whole People; but what can we Foreigners think, when we fee these Works publickly fold, and publickly recommended? nay, when we know that some of the most eminent Propagators of that hellish Doctrine have been cherished and promoted, instead of being feverely punished, as they ought and would in any other Christian Country in the World,

But wherefore should we wonder at their Indifference towards earthly K—s, when we have so many and so undoubted Tests of their Irreverence to the K—of K—s?

I won't answer, that direct Atheism has got a Footing amongst them, though there be but too much Room for the Suspicion; but I have Numbers of their Books in my Custody, which shew but too evidently that Deism has taken deep Root. I hope the Capital Error has not made its Way amongst the Generality of the People, and wish it may be confined to their sceptical Virtuosi; but had Works, questioning and doubting the Divinity and Mission of our blessed Saviour, been permitted to be publickly advertised and sold here, at Hanover, as they are at London, I should suffer the savings and to be in a long to the savings and sold suffer and the savings and sold suffer and the savings and sold suffer and savings and sold suffer and savings are savings and savings and savings are savings as the savings and savings are savings as the savings are savings are savings as the savings are savi

fpect the whole People to be infected.

I remember, when first you and I heard that our late august S-n hesitated to accept of that C-n on the Foot of the Act of S-n, we were greatly alarm'd and furprifed at his Conduct: But, my dear Friend, we were then Strangers to that strange, unaccountable People. Experience and Reading have convinced us of the Wildom of that fagacious Prince. He knew the Nation, was no Stranger to their Behaviour to their K-s, knew their Levity and Unsteadiness, their Propenfity to Faction, to Opposition and Corruption; and probably it was their Biass to Corruption, which alone determined him to comply with their Request. He might think, that, by Means of Corruption, there would be a Chance of governing a head-firong, untractable People: And if we confider the Men he employed upon his Accesfion,

fion, and the Measures he took, both then and all the rest of his Reign, we can't but suppose that he rested upon Corruption only as the Staff of his Peace and Prop of his

Safety.

To look back, we shall see that he chose to rule by a Party, and that the smallest Party, by far, of the People. According to the ordinary Maxims of Government, it was not politic to alienate thus the Hearts of the Majority of the People from him upon his first coming among them, as he must suppose, from the noted Partiality of his Condust: But upon his Maxim of Corruption, his Conduct was wife and politic by adopting a small Party, the Means of Corruption could not well fail him. He might find Places and Pensions for a Few, but could not possibly for the Whole: And could he rule the Whole by means of the Few, his Purpole was answered as well as if he had had the Affections of all the Nation in general.

That great K, who was one of the most discerning Princes of his Time, might have had a View also to the Principles and Nature of the Party he chose; for he was well read in the History of that Nation, and particularly well skill'd in the Origin, Nature and Principles of their different Parties. might observe in a Multitude of Instances, but particularly one in his own Time, the Revolution that the Torics, who were the Majority of the People, bragg'd of found Principles, ciples, and preach'd a Dostrine grateful to Princes, but never practifed either; and that the Whigs, whose Dostrine was Resistance, had however the good Sense to be complying and obsequous when they were cherish'd and distinguished: But whatever were that Prince's Motives, 'tis plain he chose to rule by a Party, which in no Sense can be accounted for but upon the Maxim of Corruption, which, in my Opinion, was that alone which induced him to accept of the C——n on any Terms.

'I is certain he received the mighty Gift with Reluctancy: And notwithstanding the humble and carneir Entreaty of his Favourites, Bernfdorf and bothmar, if a greater Favourite of another Sex had not found Means to conquer his Prejudice, he had been happier, though less potent, and we infinitely happier by having him constantly among us. That Prince, though of an even and easy Disposition, was not so happy and contented after as before the A-n; no more was K --- W ----, on whom, however, that inconsistent People bestow the Epithets, Glorious, Immortal, and Deliverer. If there be any Truth in the Report of his own Countrymen, he repented him more than once of having quitted his Dikes and Marshes, and probably would have abdicated had he lived much longer. How true this may be, I can't fay; but I will, that our late S---n had often upbraided a certain Fair, lately

lately deceased, with having persuaded him out of his Peace and Content. But what would his Dissatisfaction have been? how increased would have been his Dissontent, if he had lived to this Time, to be contemned for a Conduct towards his old, which should endear him to his new Subjects; and if he had seen a whole Nation eager to asperse those most dear to him? But, to put an End to this Digression;

His M-y had not been many Days at Aschaffenbourg before he perceived the Imprudence of moving thither without securing the Navigation of the River, by which alone the Army could hope to be supplied. Scarcity and Danger hourly and equally increasing, it was natural for him, and for us all, to thew some Refentment to the principal Authors of the Motion, which caused our Distress: hence arose that Reserve on one Side, and that fullen Haughtiness on the other, which became afterwards too great and visible to be concealed. I am sensible that another Turn, and an invidious one, has been given to this Misintelligence; but to that volatile, credulous People, Fiction and Untruth make their Way fooner and easier than Truth and Reality. They greedily swallow what reflects upon the P-e, and as willingly devour every thing that tends to the Dishonour of Foreigners; and of all Foreigners, those most, whom they ought, or rather are bound in Duty to treat with more Humanity at least, if not with Tenderness and Affection: But what Marks

of Affection can we expect from a People that are at Enmity with all the other Nations of the World; and among themselves? What Tenderness from a Nation that are T—ts to their own Fellow Subjects, and their own Flesh and Blood, only for being separated

from them by a narrow Sea.

It was not only natural, but perhaps necessary, to resent the Motion to Aschaffenbourg. Coldness towards those that had been the chief Authors of it, was no Punishment adequate to the Crime, and yet that was all the Punishment that was inflicted: But this, flight as it was, was construed to have been in Confequence of the r--- Resentment for the partial Prejudice so obvious towards our Corbs before the K-'s Arrival. 'Tis true, that the Slights put upon us were frequent, and the Infults severe and gross; but we were too much interested in his M-y's Health and Peace of Mind, to make him Complaints of Grievances which he might regret but could not remedy. We bore all the Indignities offered us with Patience, and have preferved a Silence, which, I am apt to think, has been construed to our Disadvantage. was folely the Effects of our Prudence and Regard of our S-n's Quiet, has been deem'd Weakness and Timidity: And I don't know whether our Passiveness, whilst his M-y was away, and our Silence after he came, had not encouraged those of that Nation who were with us in the Field, to dare imimpeach our Conduct and Valour at Dettingen. That they had not a colourable Shadow for their ungenerous Invectives, will appear presently; nor could they hope to meet with Credit in any Country in Europe but their own, where the most monstrous Absurdities and Falshoods go down, if propagated of

Foreigners.

It being resolved to retreat from Aschaffenbourg to Hanau, where a Corps of Helfians, and another of our Electoral Troops, marching to join the Army, were ordered to halt, the necessary Dispositions were made. E—h, as entitled to the Post of Honour. had the Head of the Army, the Austrians followed, and the Rear was the Post naturally and necessarily assigned to us. Though we might expect to march next the English, as being in English Pay, yet to avoid giving Umbrage to the Austrians, who are extremely jealous on these Occasions, we yielded to them, as being the Troops of a crown'd Head. From hence 'tis demonstrable that we had no other Choice to make; and that whether or no we approved of being posted in the Rear, we must be contented; but we were confoled in some Measure for the evident Uneasiness which the being obliged to yield the Step to the Austrians had given all our Corps, by its being judged proper that fome of the E—b Guards, both Horse and Foot, should join us. This

This Junction of the E—h Guards, with us in the Rear, was not to keep us in Countenance and in Compliment to us, as has been most invidiously suggested, but because the Rear was deem'd to be the Post of the greatest, or at least as great Peril and Danger as the Front; and had not M. de Noailles's Scheme been disconcerted by M. Grammont's Rashness, the Rear had infallibly been the

Post of most Danger and Honour.

M. de Nouilles foresaw that we could not venture leaving a sufficient Body of Troops to guard the Bridge and River at Aschaffenbourg; he knew we could not weaken our fmall Army by fuch a Separation, and therefore resolved that his most powerful Efforts should be from Aschaffenbourg on our Rear. This Disposition on the Side of the French was natural; for the Nature of the Ground in the Front was fuch, that at Dettingen 15,000 or 20,000 Men were full enough to answer their Purpose; so that their Design was, that their main Force should fall on the Rear. This appears evidently, not only from the Disposition they made, but is confirmed by the most authentic Accounts from the French themselves.

However natural this Part of the French Scheme was, the most consummate and self-sufficient of the E—h Generals did not foresee it, and therefore would have had the Front reinforced with the Flower of our Corps: But his M—y, who had rightly

penetrated M. de Noailles's Design, yielded hot to the frothy Reasoning of Men who feemed rather seized with a Panic, than arguing from found Principles. Instead of weakening the Rear, it was strengthened, as I observed before, by Part of the English Guards: Nor would this Precaution have been unnecessary, had not M. Grammont, as mentioned already, broke every Measure con-

certed by his General.

Besides this Reason for adding to, rather than diminishing the Strength of the Rear, there was another not less natural, for not permitting any of our Cavalry to march from the Rear to reinforce the Front. The Ground in the Front, between the Mountain and the River, was fo narrow, that scarce could the E—f, already there, and the Auftrians, be drawn up upon it to Advantage. Where then could the large Body of H—n Cavalry eagerly press'd to be drawn from the Rear to strengthen the Front, be placed? There was certainly no Room for them, unless some of the Cavalry already there, should retire to make Way for them: And, perhaps, this was the principal Reason why the March of our Horse from the Rear was so earnestly, and I may fay in——ly urged.

I could heartily wish this Demand for our Cavalry had been complied with, that the World might see how little Room there is for that arrogant Superiority which a haughty Nation claims over us in every Thing, but F

particularly in Point of Valour and Intrepidity. Then would it be seen who pushed fairest for Conquest and Glory; then might it be seen that Hanoverians were not more daunted, less skilful or virtuous than their Insular Fellow-Subjects. We were not, unhappily, where the Action was warmest, because it was judged it would be warmest where we were; but we had our Share of it, as may be known by the Number of our Killed and Wounded, and our Artillery was of infinite Use to the E—sh: And let me say, that had we been where the Action was hottest, we would not, nay, we could not have behaved more passively than those who were there.

Tho' M. Gramment, by advancing upon the E-fo, and quitting the Ground his Troops had been posted upon, gave them all the Advantage they could wish for; yet fo very rude and furious was the Attack of the French Cavalry, that it put the whole E---/b Line into fuch Confusion, that had the French Foot seconded the Bravery of their Horse, and had not the Austrians seasonably and couragiously interposed, 'tis thought the Confequence had been fatal, not only to that Army, but the Cause of Liberty. The Corps of French Horse that charged were much inferior in Number to those they attacked, yet fo passively and disorderly were they received, that, for awhile, it would feem as if there had been a total Deprivation of both Skill

and Courage. Nothing was feen but Diforder and Confusion; most of the Regiments gave Way; some absolutely turned the Crupper upon the Enemy, and could not be persuaded to rally; and those who behaved best, when the Panic was over, can't brag of their Prowess when they were first

charged.

But Matters went quite otherwise with the Austrians: They received the Enemy not only without Disorder or Confusion, but repelled them; and by the Repulsion, gave the E——h an Opportunity of recovering their Senses, and forming themselves into fome Order. Thus, from the Conduct and Valour of the Austrians, folely was the Scale turned to the Disadvantage of the French Cavalry, who, being Few in Number, and unsupported, were commanded to retreat, which they did in better Order than could be expected in the Presence of a superior Force: But the Truth is, those who inveigh most bitterly against us for not being in the Action, had so little Stomach to a Pursuit, that they wished the French had made a less orderly and more hasty Retreat from them.

This, my Friend, being a faithful State of the Disposition of the Army in the March from Ascaffenbourg, and of the Action at Dettingen, with what Truth or Modesty could that ungenerous People villify and asperse us in the unjust, arrogant Manner they do in those Papers you sent me?—But this was

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pretty much their Language even in the Field, where all the Austrians, to a Man, were very ready to witness against them: Yet so inexaustible is their Vanity, that not contented to load us with Infamy, they would strip those (the Austrians) of their Share of the Glory of the Action, to deck themselves with the Whole; tho it be notorious that they stand indebted to them for the Success of

the Day.

But what Inconsistency, what Business are not they capable of, who infinuate that his M - v had posted us in the Rear to preferve us from Danger? We readily own his Royal Goodneis and Tendernels for his faithful and affectionate Electoral Subjects; but had he confidered our Safety more than our Honour or Glory, we should think he dealt not only unkindly, but rigidly by us: But the Greatness of his own Soul, which is incapable of Fear, would not permit him to do us so uncourteous a Wrong. We were posted in the Rear for the Reasons already given; Reasons so convincing that they must facisfy all dispassionate Men; but I cannot hope to fatisfy the Jaundiced and Prejudiced; they are too far gone to be recovered, at least we may suppose they are, since they are not ashamed to arrogate to themselves Glories they have no Title to, and endeavour to strip those that have, and to cloath those with Infamy, who had behaved as gallantly, perhaps more fo than themselves, had they There hannily has in the Occasion.

There yet remains a much baser Infinuation, which I can perceive to be suggested by the Writers of that calumniating Nation. You could not avoid perceiving as well as I do, their injurious Undutifulness to sacred M-y. You can perceive they charge him not only with being too indulgent and partial in regard to our Corps, but with confulting his own personal Security along with ours. The Infinuation is too strong and glaring to be overlook'd; but it is too abfurd, or rathet too base and untrue to deserve to be considered or refuted.—I would be glad to know where that inconfistent People would have had his M----y to have placed himself. In the Beginning, the Rear was agreed of all Hands, except a certain G-1, to be the Post of most Risk and Danger; and after it became otherwise, by M. Grammont's Temerity, it was too late for his M-y to think of changing his Post; and yet, though the Action was warmest in the Front, the Kill'd and Wounded near his facred Person are Proofs of his not being out of Danger.

But this groundless Suggestion is of a Piece with another concerning the Wear of one Colour, or rather the changing one Colour for another on that important Day. What a Pother do they make about the Colour of a Sash, as if it imported any Thing to either that Nation or the E—e, whether it was red or yellow. I expect the next Charge will be about the Colour of his Cloaths, and the Feather

Feather in his Hat; and should an inconsistent, murmuring People fill their Gazettes with Invectives concerning the Colour of his Horse, I shall not be in the least surprised or disappointed: For when a People are capable of contracting an injurious, ungenerous Prejudice against their best Friends, without Cause or Provocation, there are no Weaknesses, no Puerilities, no Contradictions they

are not capable of.

I need not inform you, that after the Affair at Dettingen there was no Action nor Motion of any Consequence during the rest of the Campaign. The premeditated Slowness of the Dutch on one Hand, and the successless Attempts of the Prince of Lorrain to pass the Rhine, as concerted at Hanau, on the other, prevented all future Operations of Moment: But tho' the Operations against the common Enemy went on heavily, for these Reasons, Works of Malice, Prejudice and Detraction, went on briskly on one Side, though it was still Patience and Silence on the other. The Taunts, Scorn and Reflections, constantly and directly thrown out at our Country, our Corps in particular, and indirectly at the greatest and most amiable Character in the World, on the Score of Partiality, were beyond all Example, and would be beyond bearing, if the strictest Orders had not been given, and the strictest Discipline had not been observed among our Troops. Our Men wanted neither Spirit nor ReResolution, nor were they insensible; but the good Sense of the Officers, and the Obedience of the common Men, prevented the satal Consequences that might naturally result from the unjust Prejudice and Imperiousness of Men no better than themselves.

It might be expected I should account, before I quit this Part of my Subject, for the Step which the E—h G——l had thought proper to take after the Army had pass'd the Rhine. That Nobleman may have had the Advantage of being better versed in Negociation than any of our Officers; but though his Military Skill and Experience be not contested, I must beg Leave to say, we had those in our Corps who had feen as much Service and Fire as any among the E—h. Our being in the E - b Pay was no Reason that we should implicitely resign ourselves to E-h Caprice and Whim; nor that we should ppear deaf to all Reproach, and infenfible of all Imposition.—There was a discerning and great Chief in the Field, whom it was the Duty and even the Interest of all to obey; and if the Deference due and paid to him alone, has been constru'd to our Prejudice, we are more to be pitied than blamed. don't take upon me to object to the Conduct of any one Individual; but let me fay, that if a principal Officer of our Corps had quitted the Field in the Midst of a Campaign, and for any thing that could be known, at the Eve of Action; I say, had this been the Cafe

Case of a Hanoverian, all the prejudiced Pens of E-d would be nibbling at his Conduct and Character: But, tho' the Union has not wholly eradicated the Prejudice of the E--bto their northern Fellow-Islanders, yet is it nothing, compared with that lately contracted against us their Fellow-Subjects of $H \rightarrow r$: Therefore I am not at all furprifed that the partial Writers of that Nation make fo free with the Character of a principal H——nOfficer, and are so reserved in regard to one abdicating his Command, even whilst the Army was in Motion towards the Frontiers of

the Enemy.

If any thing could illustrate the Partiality of these inconsistent Scribes more, it would be for loading a Man with Praise for an Action which all Europe, except the E--b, -him for-But let him enjoy the Peace necesfary to old Age, and the Satisfaction of being praised at the Expence of the Innocent. could and would readily forgive the Praise of that prejudiced People, on Condition they would let my P-e, and my Country be at Peace? but that is a Bleffing not to be expected at the Hands of a Nation that are jealous without Reason, and abusive without Provocation.——But to resume the Subject we dropt, to recount the Conduct of the different Corps of the Army at Dettingen.

I have taken Notice, that neither previous to the Act of Settlement, nor after, till the Accession, was any the least Cause given for

the Prejudice contracted against us. But say they who are determined at all Adventures to calumniate, E—d has been put to a very great Expence and Inconveniency, by being involved in a Swedish War, soon after the Accession, to screen the Purchase of Bremen and Verden; a Purchase made too with English Money. This, tho' it be the first Article of the E—sh Impeachment against H—r, it is the biggest and most Important; as all their other Articles seem, either mediately or immediately, to be grafted upon this Stock, we will therefore examine it with Attention.

I should think it unnecessary to shew, that the War with Sweden was in Vindication of the Honour, and to protect the Commerce of E—d, and not to secure the Purchase of Bremen and Verden, because the Notoriety of the Fact is so universally known and acknowledged; but having to do with a People that disown or avow just as it may serve a present Purpose or Turn, I find myself obliged to convince them from their own Acts, and put them to the Blush, if that be possible, by Proofs drawn from themselves.

The Depredations of Sweden, before the Death of Queen Ann, and ever fince the Year 1710, were fuch as justly irritated that Princess, and, probably, would have provoked her to make Reprifuls, had she lived a few Months longer. The same, or worse Depredations were committed on the English Merchants, after the Accession; but the Rebel-

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lion in 1715, and the late King's Unwillingness to begin his Reign with a War that might increase the Burden and Debts of his new Subjects; for these Reasons, I say, he endeavoured to persuade that blinded Nation, rather than compel them by Force of Arms, to pay proper Respect to the English Flag, and do Justice to the injured Subjects of England.—The following Memorial is an ample Proof of this Affertion; and is no less an Evidence against those who invidiously place the Swedish War to the Account of the Electorate.

A MEMORIAL presented to the Chancery of Sweden, by the Resident of Great Britain, Mr. Jackson, on the 15th of August 1716.

The under-written Resident of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, hath received express Orders from the King his Master, to inform your Excellencies, and the Royal Chancery, that the Commerce of the Subjects of Great Britain having been very much interrupted for some Years past, by the Swedish Men of War and Privateers, and being render'd of late almost impracticable, by the new Edict of Regulation concerning Privateers and Prizes, publish'd last Year by his Swedish Majesty's Order; the King his Master was then obliged, for that Reason, to send a Squadron of Men of War, under the Command of his Admiral, Sir John Norris, to protect. protect the lawful Traffic of his Subjects. His Britannic Majesty promised himself from the Justice and Equity of the Demands which were then made in his Name, as well by the above-mentioned Admiral, as by the underwritten Resident, that His Majesty would soon have redress'd the Grievances complained of, and restore Commerce upon the Foot stipulated by all the Treaties between the two Crowns. But although the said Admiral waited a long Time, he had yet the Missfortune to return Home without receiving the least Satisfaction: Neither hath the under-written Resident ever obtain'd any Answer to his Memorials upon that Subject.

Nevertheless, His Majesty hath all a long hoped, that when his Swedish Majesty would more maturely have weighed the repeated Instances made thereupon, he would afterwards have given the necessary Orders for putting a Stop to the reasonable and well-grounded Complaints of Great Britain; but on the contrary, he fees with a very fenfible Concern, that his Subjects Grievances are multiplied, instead of being lessen'd, several of their Ships being taken this Year, and brought into Sweden, without Reason, or the least Shadow of Justice; particularly, five or fix have been conficated within this Fortnight at Gottenburgh, notwithstanding they were bound h ther to Stockholm, as plainly appears from their Passports and Papers. A Treatment as extraordinary as it is unprecedented.

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Wherefore, the under-written Resident hath it in Command, especially to let your Excellencies, and the Royal Chancery know, that the King his Master hath thought fit to send the faid Sir John Norris again with a Squadron of his Ships, which are lately come into the Sound accordingly, in order to protect the British Commerce, and to demand once more, that Reparation and Satisfaction be made to his Subjects, for the Damage they have sustain'd by the Loss of their Ships, and the Confiscation of their Effects; and that the Difficulties which the British Commerce lies under from the above-named Edict, may forthwith be removed; also that sufficient Security be given, that for the future the faid Commerce shall be restored upon the Foot stipulated by Treaties: The under-written Resident is ordered to insist upon these Demands in the strongest Terms.

And whereas divers Rebels are fled from Great Britain into the Swedish Countries, the under-written Resident is surther charged to represent, that the King his Master promises himself from the Equity and Friendship of his Swedish Majesty, that he will make no Difficulty to give Assurances, and to engage solemnly never directly nor indirectly to give the least Assistance, Support or Resuge to the Pretender to his Crown, nor any Protection to the Lord Dussis, and others, who are lately fled into Sweden from Scotland, nor to any other Person who took Part in the Rebellion

tion which not long fince was happily quell'd in Great Britain.

The under-written Resident is moreover commanded to acquaint your Excellencies, and the Royal Chancery, in the Name of the King his Master, that His Majesty, for Reafons of the greatest Weight, looks upon the Conquest of Norway, by the Arms of his Swedish Majesty, or the Reduction of any of the Islands belonging to the Crown of Denmark, as a Matter of the last Importance for the Commerce of his Subjects, and for the Peace and Prosperity of his Kingdoms; especially now that the Navigation of the whole Baltick is so very much restrained by the Swedish Men of War and Privateers: Wherefore, if his Majesty still persists in the Execution of the faid Designs, the King his Master must think it a Slight upon the most effential Interests of Great Britain, not to make Use of the Means which God hath put into his Hands to baffle those Enterprizes.

The under-written Resident is ordered at the same Time, to assure you, that in Case his Swedish Majesty will be pleased to give Satisfaction on the Points above-mentioned, the King his Master shall be very ready, and very well inclined on his Part, to strengthen and maintain the good Understanding which hath so long subsisted between the two Crowns, and which is so much to be wished, and so necessary between Protestant Princes. And that he may the better shew his earnest Desire

Defire to cultivate his Swedish Majesty's Friendship, he will very gladly employ his best Offices to adjust the Differences between His Majesty and the other Northern Powers, and to procure as good a Peace as is possible in

the present Conjuncture of Affairs.

His Swedish Majesty's Justice and Prudence are so well known, that it is not doubted but he will look upon the Propositions which the under-written Resident hath had the Honour to make in the King his Master's Name, to be so just and equitable, that he will give a savourable Answer to them without Delay. The under-written Resident earnestly prays your Excellencies, and the Royal Chancery, to represent these Things in the proper Place, and in the Manner which the Importance of the Subject requires; and that he may speedily be savour'd with a suitable Answer in Writing, in order to send the same to the King his gracious Master.

Stockholm, June 15, 1716. JACKSON.

This Memorial, which was the last of many to the same Purpose that had been presented to Sweden on the Part of England for sour Years before, renders it unnecessary for me to bring more substantial Proofs that the Interest of Hanover was in no Ways concern'd in the Swedish War, nor that the Purchase of Bremen and Verden could in no Sense be the Occasion of it: But as the Nation that

that forces the Pen into my Hand, by their ungenerous Prejudice to mine, are more willfully steady in their own mistaken Conceits than any in the World, tho' fickle to a Proverb, in most other Things, I shall, for the Sake of the Misguided amongst them, examine this whole Matter minutely, but truly and succinctly as possible. It will then, I'm persuaded, so evidently appear that there has been no Partiality to the Interests of Hanover, as to the Swedish War, and the Purchases aforesaid, that the prejudiced E—h will be convinced at least, tho' perhaps not silenced.

The War between Sweden and Denmark, which occasioned the Loss of Bremen and Verden, was declared in 1709. The King of Denmark possessed himself of Stade and the Dutchy of Bremen in 1712. The Elector, our august Sovereign, employed all that Time his most friendly Endeavours to pacify the Troubles in the North, and to preserve to Sweden all her Territories in the Empire, first by promoting and joining in the Treaty concerted by the Members of the Grand Alliance, for procuring a perfect Neutrality for those Provinces, and for joining an Army of 15,000 Men to the Swedish Troops under General Grassau, for repelling any Invasion of them; which Treaty was agreed to by the Regency of Sweden, but rejected in the most haughty Manner by their headstrong King, in just such an indecent, ungrateful Manner as

the Friendship and Cordiality of our fincere Countrymen are rejected and despised by a moody, headstrong Nation, who require such a stiff-necked Prince as Charles XII. to keep them within Bounds.

Our Sovereign, in the next Place, obtained of the King of Prussia, for that of Sweden, in October 1713, a Treaty of Sequestration for Pomerania, which was agreed to by Sweden, but soon after violated by that Crown. And, in the last Place, his late Majesty procured a Congress of all the Powers concerned, to be opened at Brunswick in 1714, for pacifying the Troubles of the North.

But his Swedish Majesty, by an unaccountable Obstinacy, not only rendered all these good Offices fruitless, but made use of the most ungrateful Menaces (such as are made lately, if our Electoral Troops encamp in the same Field with our E—b Fellow-Subjects) to the King, our Elector, in Return for his Friendship, and all those his sincere good Offices.

In Consequence of this ungrateful Prejudice, a strong Swedish Army was actually marching into the Heart of the Lower Saxony in the Beginning of the Year 1715. Then it was, and not before, that Prussia declared War against Sweden, the 28th of April; and that our most gracious Sovereign, on the 26th of July following, agreed with Denmark for the Purchase of Bremen and Verden, on Part of which he had already such considerable Mort-

gages from the Crown of Sweden, as made it prudent, and even necessary, to secure the Possession of the Whole from Denmark.

Thus, in October 1715, when all other Means of bringing the late unhappy King of Sweden to Reason proved ineffectual, his late Majesty, our august Sovereign, as Elector, was the last of all the neighbouring Powers that declared War against that Crown. This he must unavoidably have done in his own Defence, if he had never feen England; and his subsequent Declaration of War against Sweden, as King of England, he must as unavoidably have done, in Defence of the Honour of the English Flag, and Rights and Commerce of his English Subjects, if he had

never feen nor known Hanover.

So that to examine the Origin and Progress of the Differences between Hanover and Sweden, and England and Sweden, it will be feen that they were perfectly distinct, and that nothing can be more injurious and unjust than to complicate them, as the E— \vec{h} generally do, in order to perfuade the World that all their Wars, Expences, Taxes, Interruptions and Impediments of Commerce, fince the Accession, are owing solely to the Partiality of our Sovereigns to the Interests of their native Country. A base and unjust Infinuation, that has no Foundation but in the jaundiced Imagination of a People different from, and differing with all the World.

Thus

Thus fared it with that great Prince whom they call, and very justly, their Deliverer; but from them such Epithets mean no more than their Addresses from many of their Counties and Towns, wherein they offer their Lives and Fortunes to the reigning Prince as Words of Course, without any Meaning or Intention of being in earnest. The Addresses to King Charles I. whose Head was cut off, and to Oliver, who was the chief Author of it, to King James II. who was fent a begging, and to the Deliverer, to whom they were fo much obliged: I fay, the Words of some of their Addresses to those several Governors, run in pretty near the fame Stile; and in all of them, there is an ample and plain Tender made of their Lives and Fortunes. Such is the Inconfishency of a People steady in nothing fo much as in hating and despising Foreigners: But, would they know the Truth, most, if not all Foreigners are Even with them. How did they inveigh against King William for his Partiality to the Interests of Holland? and how prejudiced were they to the Dutch, because the King was a Dutchman born, and found it necessary to spend a few Months in the Year amongst a People whom he knew loved his Person and Family, and would contribute to his Satisfaction and Peace of Mind.

But is not this our Case directly? Are we not despised and contemned, I am asraid hated too, for our Sovereign's vouchsasing sometimes

times to unbend his Royal Mind amongst us? Surely did that prejudiced People know how much we are Losers by the Accession of Royalty to our august Family, they would not treat us with fo great Asperity. Before the Accession, we were the happiest People in the World; bleffed by our Prince, and bleffed in him: He was likewise happy and bleffed, in being furrounded and ferved by as faithful, affectionate, and honest a People as any in Europe: But can he say as much of his new S-s? or is he to blame for having a peculiar Regard for a People that would die to give him, if necessary, Proofs of their Zeal and Duty? Is he not rather to be commended for shewing a Sense of the Satisfaction he feels in having so virtuous a People for Subjects? And ought he to be traduced for spending a few of his Hours amongst those, to whom he knows he is so dear? Heaven knows our Hearts; and our gracious Sovereign doubts not that his Presence is dear to us, not from any lucrative Views, but the purest Affection for his facred Person.

There are no Benefits accruing to us; there can be none from our Sovereign's being King of a powerful Nation at so great a Distance from us: But had his Kingdoms been nearer, as their Laws stand, we can never benefit by his Royalty. We are for ever excluded from the Advantages we might reasonably hope for by the Greatness of our Prince. We are shut out from all Employments, Emoluments

 H_2

and Honours, among our new Fellow-Subjects, though we were made believe by some of themselves, that all Disqualification should be removed in Time.—But Sincerity for them.—I know nothing we have got by the mighty Change, but being hated by those whom we once esteem'd, and despised by those who have no Right or Title, on the Score of Virtue or Merit of any Kind, to claim a Superiority over us: And yet, if you will believe that calumniating Nation, their Country is become a Money-Province to us.—Pity they should not be as Moneyless as we, who are capable of so absurd an

Aspertion.

England is a rich and opulent Country; But how does Hanover benefit by her Oppulency? If our common Sovereign have a large Revenue in England, do not the E----b alone participate of it? Do not the Writings of their own Libellers prove, that the Civil List is insufficient to feed their own Corruption? and don't they fay, that the late Minifter employed all that could be spared from the Support of the Grandeur of the Crown to the Purposes of Domestic Corruption? If this be true, 'tis plain that no Part of the Civil List could be spared so as to be transported to us. If then, as we are debarred all Benefits from Employments by the Act of Settlement, we can have no English Money, unless it be out of the Civil List, and that this Fund is scarce sufficient to satiate E—-bCorCorruption, according to these Libellers themselves; if this be the Case, I say, our Country is necessarily acquitted of being richer-by the Accession, and England being a Money-Province to Hanover. This Argument surely is conclusive against those who inveighed against the late Minister, and who vilify no less the present great Men at the

Helm on the Score of Corruption?

The Truth is, our late Sovereign wanted not English Money to pay for the Purchase of Bremen and Verden. A long Peace, and the Parcimony of his Ancestors, enabled him to lay out of his H—n Treasure more than was necessary for that Purpose. Next the King of Prussa, he was, at the Accession, the most money'd Prince in the Empire; and without any Exception, he was the happiest. We, his Subjects, were likewise the happiest in all Germany; and are we far less happy now; as we certainly are, it is because our august Princes have exchanged the light Ducal for the heavy, irksome, Regal Crown.

But the Case is widely different with regard to the E-h Nation, who are obviously Gainers by the Change. Hanover is as much an Accession to the Power of England as Ireland; and therefore every Acquisition to the Territories of that Electorate must be of Advantage to England. But no Acquisition our Sovereign could make, could be so advantageous to the English as that of Bremen and Verden: For, to consider that Purchase in every

Sense,

Sense, nothing could be more useful to England, and nothing therefore should be more gratefully remembered and acknowledged. A bare Inspection into the Map of Europe

amply justifies this Assertion.

The Rivers Elbe and Weser, both navigable, are the only Inlets from the British Seas to Germany. Now, I think, 'tis no Question but that it is greatly for the Interest of England, that the Countries which command the Navigation of these Rivers should belong. to its Monarch, and confequently be always in its Power. Did these Countries remain to the Conquerors of them, the Danes, how. precarious might the English Trade be to the North, but particularly to Hamburgh, a City on which Denmark has formed Pretentions. which she would infallibly execute one Time or other, and could, if she had the Command of the Elbe and Weser. Were those Countries to return to Sweden, might not the Commerce of England be interrupted in case of a War with that Crown, even in the British Seas, as much as in the Baltick?

But there is a further and greater Advantage accruing to England from that Purchase, which she ought to wish to be made good to her Prince for ever, though it should cost her Millions; and that is, that by Means of the Navigation of these Rivers, the Elbe and Weser, she may be suddenly and certainly succoured from Hanover in case of Invasions from abroad, or Insurrections at home.

But

But of all the Extravagancies of the English Writers, I know of none more absurd than an Infinuation I have feen made by fome of them, that by Means of those Rivers our august Sovereigns of the present Royal Line might introduce what Number of Troops they pleased into Britain from the Electorate, in order to enflave their British Subjects. Did ever any Conception more romantic and chimerical enter into the Heart of Man, or fall from the Pen of Men who would pass for Politicians and Men of Parts? It puts me in mind of the Poet's rich Miser, who starved himself in his Youth, for fear he should want in old Age. Surely so eminently brave a Nation as the E—h, are above dreading to be enflayed by a People whom they themfelves represent as the most cowardly Nation in Europe.

Another Infinuation equally, or rather more absurd is, that the Corps of our Troops taken into the E-b Pay last Year, and marched to Flanders to winter there, both last Winter and the present, was with an Intention to have them at Hand in case their Partydisputes in E d should blaze into an Infurrection; nay, they refine upon the Scheme, faying, that, befide this Use to be made of this Body of Men, preferable to their native Troops, who may be apt to divide with the different Parties, they are brought into E—h Pay, and as near E—d as possible, fo to habituate the Nation to them by Degrees, that it will be no manner of Surprise, whenwhenever it shall be thought proper to have them wasted thither from the Continent.—As from a Nation that seed upon Whim and Chimera, any Absurdity may be expected, I shan't in the least wonder if they suggest, that a Plot and an Insurrection will be secretly somented, purposely to have a Pretext for introducing that enslaving Body of Troops.

I wonder how that felf-contradicting People will at last dispose of these Hanoverians in their Pay; I should be glad to know in what Light they will confider them: At certain Times they are more terrible than Popery, more fierce than Pandours, and more gigantic and cruel than Sarazins: Yet at others, they are Cowards, mere Images of Wax for Shew, Creatures that can't stand an Army of Pigmies, and of no Use in the World, but as Instruments to impoverish E—d, and enrich the Electorate. Am not I warranted from their own Writings, and Prints; nay, from the Speeches of Men, who, one wou'd think, should be above vulgar Prejudice and Uncandidness, to paint that Nation's Absurdities and Contradictions in the Light I do. Would not all Europe think me a flattering, cringing Painter if I had drawn them less natural and deform'd? Should not I be deem'd a Fawner, a meer Spaniel Cur, if I did cajole a People that treat my Country inhumanly, my Countrymen arrogantly, myself injuriously, and my P-e undutifully? No, my noble Friend, there

are certain Bounds beyond which Passiveness becomes a Fault instead of a Virtue. I am drove to that critical Point, by the base Calumnies of licentious Pens; therefore fuch Quarters as I receive will I give; with this Difference, that my Enemies speak the Language of the Arch-Deliverer, I speak that of the divine Chastiser. They could not charge our Troops with Cowardice at Dettingen; they could not condemn our Conduct throughout the whole Campaign; they could not arraign our S-n's Partiality in the Field, as they do, had they spoke the Language of Truth; nor could I do less than retort the injurious Treatment, by speaking naked Truth, if I would not appear the Coward Confectio-

ner I am represented to be.

If I mention the E-----/h Nation generally, it is with no Intention to vilify those of them. who are unprejudiced. These I revere and esteem as much as I detest the Baseness of those that treat us rigorously, for no Reason but that we are not E - h - n. I envy them not the Appellation, believing myself every whit as highly honour'd by that of Hanoverian. I would be an Hottentot with the Character of Steadiness, Humanity, Loyalty and Sincerity, before I would an -, with that of Fickleness, Barbarity, Disloyalty and Difingenuity. I would be the Slave, whom that prejudiced People injuriously paint me and all my Countrymen to be, before I would enjoy

enjoy the Liberty they boast of, to abuse it as they do, with regard to G-d and M-n.

But there are among them some Men that do Honour to the whole People, Men whom old Rome need not blush to own for Sons. And foremost of this exalted Few, is that great Genius, that noble Luminary, that Pattern of Politeness, Courtesy and Affability, who accompanied his and our most gracious S-n to the Field all the last Sum-He is a living Witness in our Favour, and is no less one to disprove the Calumnies our Troops have been aspersed with. To him we willingly appeal; his great Soul is above being biass'd by any self-interested Views; therefore may his Country rely on an equitable Decree from him; for being no less just than he is generous; he is uncapable of Partiality or Difingenuity. Spight of the growing false Prejudice of his jaundiced Countrymen, he dares, I persuade myself, speak Truth; he dares stand forth a Champion in Favour of injured Merit; he dares, like a brave and honest Man as he is, vindicate the Character of gallant Troops, who are afperfed only for being distinguish'd and cherish'd, but in Proportion to their Loyalty and Merit.

Would the E—h fearch the World round, they could not meet with Troops on whom they could reckon so fecurely as those Hanoverians in their Pay. Their Fidelity and Resolution are as incontestible, as their Attachment

tachment to the Interest of E—d. The great Statesman mentioned above, was convinced of this Truth; he was sensible of our Merit, when he advised, or assented to our being prefered to other Foreigners. He had in reality no other Choice to make in the then Situation of Affairs; nor do I suppose, if he had, that he would be more partial to others than to us. But why should we be deem'd Foreigners that obey the same Prince? Incongruous Distinction! Yet this is that fatal Distinction which has created that injurious Prejudice we have so much Reason to complain of. The Prejudice is stronger in relation to us than any other; for are not the Hessians as much Foreigners as we are, yet are they spared whilst we are loaded with the basest Calumnies: But what else but Inconfistancy can be expected from a People that are as inconstent as their Climate, and as vain as they are fickle?

You, my dear Friend, will readily pardon the Trouble I give, when you consider how much I give myself, and how grosly I must be treated to descend to the low Office of measuring a Weapon I handle so aukwardly, with a People who are too apt to indulge their Spleen and Malice, at the Expence of all that is sacred amongst Men. I am,

Yours, &c.













